“Read-only” users who can still write
We inspect every mutating path for inconsistent role checks, IDOR, tenant crossover and privilege escalation.
Adversarial AI code security reviews for software built with Claude Code, Cursor, Lovable, Bolt, Replit and other AI coding tools. We look beyond obvious code smells to find exploitable business logic, permission failures, payment risks, data leaks and cost-abuse paths.
Read-only review. No source-code uploads required. Never send us secrets or credentials.
SEC-004 — Read-only user can create a manager Severity: MEDIUM · Confidence: HIGH Credible attack path 1. Viewer submits a hidden POST action 2. Endpoint checks membership, not role 3. Viewer invites a manager 4. Privilege boundary is bypassed Existing controls? Sibling endpoints block viewers. This one doesn't. Required fix: Enforce capability on every mutation. Required regression: Assert DENIED — and prove the invite side-effect never fired.
Vibe coding and AI coding tools are exceptionally good at making features work. Security failures often live somewhere else: in assumptions, permissions, trust boundaries, retries and the way different parts of the application interact.
We inspect every mutating path for inconsistent role checks, IDOR, tenant crossover and privilege escalation.
We trace expensive work — LLMs, third-party APIs, email, storage, queues and CPU — and ask how cheaply it can be abused.
Anything visible in a browser, URL or client app is treated as attacker-visible. We check what authority it accidentally grants.
We examine signatures, idempotency, retry behaviour, server-authoritative pricing and fail-closed billing decisions.
We follow the complete fetch path: redirects, DNS resolution, private ranges, response bounds and trust of forwarded headers.
After a fix, we look for bypasses, missed sibling endpoints and new vulnerabilities introduced by the patch itself.
A useful security finding should tell you what an attacker can do, why your current controls don't stop it, and exactly what has to be proven after the fix.
Public URL and repository link. Private repos are arranged separately with temporary read-only access.
Accounts, permissions, payments, tenants, external services, data and costly operations.
Severity, confidence, attack path, impact, existing controls, minimal fix and regression test.
The patch gets an adversarial pass for bypasses, incomplete fixes and newly introduced risk.
Automated scanners are useful. They are not the same thing as reasoning about the application an attacker actually sees.
For AI-built or heavily AI-assisted applications that are live, approaching launch, or about to start handling real users, payments or customer data. Submit the project first; we'll confirm fit and scope before any payment.
Do not submit passwords, API keys, .env files, access tokens or repository credentials. For private repositories, we'll arrange temporary read-only access separately.
No. Never send us passwords, API keys, access tokens, .env files or other credentials. A security review should not require you to give away production secrets.
Submit the project without credentials. If we accept the review, we'll arrange temporary read-only repository access separately.
No. Automated tooling can be part of a review, but the focus here is adversarial reasoning: authority, business logic, trust boundaries, tenant isolation, payments, replay, cost abuse and how controls interact.
Yes. Confirmed findings are written to be actionable, with a specific remediation direction and a regression test your coding workflow can implement.
The important part: the fix is reviewed again. We look for bypasses, incomplete patches, missed sibling paths and new risk created by the repair.
No. This is a founding-review price while we validate the service, scope the work properly and learn what makes these reviews most valuable.